The success of deep learning in natural language processing raises intriguing questions about the nature of linguistic meaning and ways in which it can be processed by natural and artificial systems. One such question has to do with subword segmentation algorithms widely employed in language modeling, machine translation, and other tasks since 2016. These algorithms often cut words into semantically opaque pieces, such as ‘period’, ‘on’, ‘t’, and ‘ist’ in ‘period|on|t|ist’. The system then represents the resulting segments in a dense (...) vector space, which is expected to model grammatical relations among them. This representation may in turn be used to map ‘period|on|t|ist’ (English) to ‘par|od|ont|iste’ (French). Thus, instead of being modeled at the lexical level, translation is reformulated more generally as the task of learning the best bilingual mapping between the sequences of subword segments of two languages; and sometimes even between pure character sequences: ‘p|e|r|i|o|d|o|n|t|i|s|t’ → ‘p|a|r|o|d|o|n|t|i|s|t|e’. Such subword segmentations and alignments are at work in highly efficient end-to-end machine translation systems, despite their allegedly opaque nature. The computational value of such processes is unquestionable. But do they have any linguistic or philosophical plausibility? I attempt to cast light on this question by reviewing the relevant details of the subword segmentation algorithms and by relating them to important philosophical and linguistic debates, in the spirit of making artificial intelligence more transparent and explainable. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE O RETARDO DA MATURIDADE SEXUAL EM BOVINOS -/- -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva -/- Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim -/- [email protected] ou [email protected] -/- WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- -/- 12. RETARDO DA MATURIDADE SEXUAL -/- -/- Nos animais em crescimento, as deficiências em qualquer dos nutrientes: proteína, energia, macro ou microminerais, vitaminas e aporte hídrico, geram inibição das sínteses de proteínas específicas como os fatores de crescimento. Neste tipo de situação, as taxas (...) de ganho de peso e o desenvolvimento dos diferentes segmentos do trato reprodutivo se alteram. Os animais atrasam a idade a que chegam à puberdade, atrasando a entrada na vida produtiva como animais aptos a se reproduzir. O quadro de atraso à puberdade ocasiona atraso na idade a que se apresenta o primeiro parto, fator responsável por grande parte das falhas na eficiência reprodutiva. Sem dúvida, aspectos nutricionais são os maiores limitantes no crescimento e na maturidade reprodutiva, sendo assim, esse trabalho têm como cunho a apresentação de alguns destes fatores: -/- 12.1 Relação Energia:Proteína -/- A maturidade sexual relaciona-se com um consumo adequado de energia e com a obtenção de um peso corporal adequado; o crescimento depende, em grande medida, da ingestão abundante de elementos energéticos. Uma ração deficiente em energia diminui a velocidade de crescimento, reduz a produção de leite, retarda a puberdade, reduz a fertilidade e diminui a resistência às doenças e ao parasitismo. -/- Uma das causas mais comuns da baixa fertilidade e do atraso da maturidade sexual nas vacas leiteiras é a falta de energia em relação às necessidades do animal ou um balanço de energia negativo; além disso, este atraso no início tardio da maturidade sexual diminui o tempo de vida durante o qual os animais têm uma reprodução ativa. -/- A falta de energia na ração pode ser causada por um consumo insuficiente de alimentos ou por uma baixa digestibilidade de seus componentes (dieta de baixa qualidade) e, por um teor elevado de umidade na dieta. O baixo consumo de energia é normalmente o resultado de restrições alimentares. Em qualquer uma das situações, a falta de energia impede o animal de expressar seu potencial genético de produção e o problema complica-se se, por sua vez, existe deficiência em proteínas, minerais e vitaminas. -/- Como referenciado anteriormente, a energia têm papel fundamental em todos os mecanismos fisiológicos do animal, seja para a reprodução, fornecimento de leite ou para produção de carne, uma vez que possui relação direta com as mitocôndrias celulares. A energia é considerada um tipo de gordura, e possui relação direta com o sistema reprodutivo da vaca. Para a produção de leite, uma vaca pode utilizar suas reservas de gordura e transformá-las em leite, isto é, a cada quilo de gordura corporal pode-se obter de 7 a 9 quilos de leite. O fornecimento de energia têm como fator a categoria animal, o sistema produtivo, a idade etc. logo, a administração de energia deve obedecer os parâmetros de 1,75 a 1,25 Mcal/kg do alimento fornecido, seja matéria seca, volumoso ou ração concentrada. Vale frisar novamente que os níveis de energia administrada devem ser altos (1,72 Mcal/kg) para as vacas no início da lactação e deve-se diminuir gradativamente conforme chega o final da lactação, chegando a 1,54 Mcal/kg ou menos. No caso de prevenção contra o retardamento dos animais à idade reprodutiva, os níveis de energia para as bezerras de 0-3 meses com ± 150 kg deve ser de 1,70 Mcal/kg de MS para mantença e de 1,06 Mcal para ganho de peso diário; para bezerras com idade entre 6-12 meses e um peso de ± 250 kg o nível de energia deve ser de 1,54 Mcal para mantença e de 0,97 para ganho; por fim, para bezerras chegando a categoria de novilhas (> 12 meses) o ideal é o fornecimento de 1,39 Mcal para mantença e de 0,81 Mcal para ganho. Os alimentos que mais fornecem energia são o sebo, a gordura protegida, o milho, etc. -/- O efeito da proteína da dieta na reprodução é complexo. Em geral, quantidades inadequadas de proteína na dieta reduzem a produção de leite e o desempenho reprodutivo (maturidade sexual). Deficiências de proteínas diminuem os níveis de proteínas de reserva ou de transporte no sangue, fígado e músculos o que predispõe o animal a várias doenças que podem levar a não manifestação da maturidade sexual ou mesmo a morte. -/- Há tipos de proteínas como a PB (proteína bruta), a PDR (proteína degradada no rúmen), proteína metabolizável entre outras, ambas possuem relação com a PB e são primordiais no entendimento da nutrição de ruminantes. Os níveis de PDR se forem baixos mostra uma boa população microbiana presente no rúmen do animal, esse compartimento que se desenvolve conforme a ingestão de alimentos concentrados. -/- Para que se possa prevenir o retardamento dos animais à maturidade sexual, deve-se estar atentos aos níveis de proteína que se administra aos animais, em especial para as bezerras que entrarão logo na puberdade estando aptas para se reproduzir. Contudo, o tipo e a quantidade de proteína se limita a fatores como os ingredientes da ração, método alimentar utilizado na propriedade e o potencial produtivo do lote que se maneja. Sendo assim, os níveis oscilam conforme a categoria, idade e peso como demonstra na tabela 1, que traz os níveis ideias de proteína que devem estar presentes na alimentação das bezerras conforme idade e peso médio das mesmas. -/- Tabela 1: Exigências de proteína em bezerras e novilha -/- Nutriente 3-6 meses (± 150 kg) 6-12 meses (± 250 kg) > 12 meses (± 400 kg) -/- PB % 16 12 12 -/- PDR % 8,2 4,3 2,1 -/- Fonte: TEIXEIRA, 1997. -/- Para que as bezerras entrem na maturidade sexual sem atraso ou quaisquer problema, é ideal que a ração que viera ser fornecida para as mesmas possuam uma quantidade básica de 22% de PB presente na composição. Os alimentos mais proteicos são os de origem animal como a farinha de sangue, de penas etc., porém sua administração deve ser limitada. Sendo assim, a tabela 2 traz os possíveis melhores alimentos a serem ofertados aos animais e sua quantidade diária para que se possa suprir os requerimentos dos animais e prevenir o retardamento sexual ou qualquer outro problema reprodutivo que tenha relação nutricional. -/- Tabela 2: Alimentos proteicos e quantidades ideais para bovinos -/- Alimento PB% Quantidade % da mistura ou kg/cab./dia -/- Caroço de algodão 21 ± 50% da mistura da ração (1 kg = 0,5 kg de caroço) -/- Farelo de glúten de milho 23 Pode substituir o volumoso (máximo 3,5 kg/cab./dia) -/- Grão de soja 38 ± 20% da mistura (1 kg = 0,2 kg de grão) ou no máximo 2,5-3,5 kg/cab./dia -/- Farelo de algodão 41 ± 30-40% da mistura (1 kg = 0,3-0,4 kg de farelo) ou no máximo 4,5 kg/cab./dia -/- Fonte: TEIXEIRA, 1997. -/- A Ureia e outras substâncias que contêm nitrogênio não proteico (NNP) podem ser utilizadas pelos microrganismos do rúmen para a produção de proteínas bacterinas. Em geral, a utilização da NNP não é recomendada, exceto em situações especiais de alimentação e sob controle técnico, uma vez que um manejo inadequado, nomeadamente de excessos de consumo, pode provocar intoxicações com efeitos letais (ROIG, 2003; FERGUSON et al., 1989). É claro que as fontes de NNP não possuem aminoácidos e que muitos deles são essenciais e não são sintetizados pela microbiota ruminal. -/- Alguns autores argumentam que o nitrogênio não proteico (NNP) como a ureia, pode ser muito bem utilizado desde que não exceda um terço do total de nitrogênio na dieta diária ou 3% da ração de grãos de cereais e após adaptação gradual de, pelo menos, três semanas. A boa utilização da ureia nos ruminantes depende da ração conter pelo menos 75% de nutrientes digestíveis totais NDT, disponibilidade suficiente de amido e de CNE para converter o nitrogênio da ureia em proteína microbiana e quando o teor de proteína verdadeira da ração não for inferior a 12% (ROIG, 2003). -/- 12.2 Minerais (K e I) -/- Um excesso de potássio no sangue ocorre quando o consumo excede a capacidade do rim de o eliminar, provocando um atraso na maturidade sexual, ciclos sexuais irregulares e baixa natalidade; também interfere na absorção intestinal do magnésio, dificultando a absorção e o metabolismo do cálcio, magnésio e sódio; geralmente afeta fêmeas de alta produção leiteira (com o leite é excretado muito magnésio). -/- No macho, o excesso de potássio diminui a fecundidade, altera as vesículas seminais e influencia a composição espermática. Na fêmea prejudicaria os ciclos sexuais (duração e intensidade). -/- A excreção de íons de potássio diminui quando se ingere pouca quantidade deste elemento e de sódio, e quando há acidose aguda ou insuficiência das glândulas adrenais. -/- O potássio é um elemento de muitas funções no metabolismo animal e participa de múltiplos mecanismos fisiológicos, dentre eles o reprodutivo. Sendo assim, é importante o criador estar atento sobre a administração do mineral na alimentação das bezerras que vão entrar para a maturidade sexual. De forma geral, é indicado fornecer matéria seca que contenha K na ordem de 0,6 a 1% da composição do alimento. Em média, uma vaca de 600 kg que produz 15 kg de leite ingira cerca de 230 gramas desse mineral diariamente. -/- Em crescimento, a função tireoide tem um papel protetor da sexualidade e estimula a puberdade por suas relações com as funções hipofisária e ovariana, atuando como sensibilizador da gônada para o aparecimento do estro; sendo, na fêmea sinérgico com a FSH. Uma deficiência na produção de hormonas da tireoide induzirá uma redução na troca de energia e na liberação de calor corporal, ou seja, ocorre uma diminuição no metabolismo basal do -/- As iodo-proteínas ou tireoproteínas (T3 e T4) beneficiam o crescimento e a secreção láctea, no macho estimulam a puberdade (maturidade sexual) e são gametogênicas (a hipófise é estimulada pela tiroxina e a vitamina A). -/- Para se livrar do atraso e da desordem da administração dos animais e do cronograma da fazenda, o proprietário deve atentar ao fornecimento adequado de I que varia entre 0,34 e 0,88 mg/kg de MS. -/- As formas de prevenção por parte desses minerais poderá ser manejada através dos alimentos, da água ou via suplementação mineral injetável. Por fim, o criador poderá ficar tranquilo e ter seu cronograma estabelecido sendo posto e prática e obtendo êxito no plantel. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- BARRENHO, Gonçalo José Pinheiro. Nutrição e fertilidade em bovinos de leite. 2016. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade de Évora. -/- BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. -/- BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. -/- CASTILLO-BADILLA, Gloriana et al. Efecto de la edad al primer parto sobre parámetros productivos en vacas Jersey de Costa Rica. Agronomía Mesoamericana, v. 24, n. 1, p. 177-187, 2013. -/- DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. -/- DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. -/- DIAS, Juliano Cesar et al. Alguns aspectos da interação nutrição-reprodução em bovinos: energia, proteína, minerais e vitaminas. PUBVET, v. 4, p. Art. 738-743, 2010. -/- FERGUSON, James D.; CHALUPA, William. Impact of protein nutrition on reproduction in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 72, n. 3, p. 746-766, 1989. -/- GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. -/- GRANJA, Yury Tatiana; CERQUERA, Jefferson; FERNÁNDEZ, Omar. Factores nutricionales que interfieren en el desempeño reproductivo de la hembra bovina. Revista Colombiana de Ciencia Animal, v. 4, n. 2, p. 458-472, 2012. -/- MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. -/- NOGUEIRA, E. et al. Nutrição aplicada à reprodução de bovinos de corte. Embrapa Pantanal-Capítulo em livro científico (ALICE), 2015. -/- PASA, Camila. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2011. -/- ROIG, C. Alimentación del ganado caprino. Informe técnico: PROGANO-INTA. Colonia Benítez, Chaco, Argentina, 2003. -/- SARTORI, Roberto; GUARDIEIRO, Monique Mendes. Fatores nutricionais associados à reprodução da fêmea bovina. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 39, p. 422-432, 2010. -/- SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. -/- TEIXEIRA, J. C.; TEIXEIRA, LFAC. Alimentação de bovinos leiteiros. FAEPE, Lavras, 1997. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...) illustrates that even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation. (shrink)

How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.

It is often said that ‘what it is like’-knowledge cannot be acquired by consulting testimony or reading books [Lewis 1998; Paul 2014; 2015a]. However, people also routinely consult books like What It Is Like to Go to War [Marlantes 2014], and countless ‘what it is like’ articles and youtube videos, in the apparent hope of gaining knowledge about what it is like to have experiences they have not had themselves. This article examines this puzzle and tries to solve it by (...) appealing to recent work on knowing-wh ascriptions. In closing I indicate the wider significance of these ideas by showing how they can help us to evaluate prominent arguments by Paul [2014; 2015a] concerning transformative experiences. (shrink)

This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in (...) philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude intellectualism—offers an attractive set of (...) solutions to various puzzles concerning the connections between knowing-how and abilities and skills to perform intentional actions. (shrink)

Hawley introduced the idea of the client's perspective on knowledge, which she used to illuminate knowing-how and cases of epistemic injustice involving knowing-how. In this paper, I explore how Hawley's idea might be used to illuminate not only knowing-how, but other forms of knowledge that, like knowing-how, are often claimed to be distinct from mere knowing-that, focusing on the case studies of moral understanding and ‘what it is like’-knowledge.

Knowledge-how often appears to be more difficult to transmit by testimony than knowledge-that and knowledge-wh. Some philosophers have argued that this difference provides us with an important objection to intellectualism—the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. This article defends intellectualism against these testimony-based objections.

Paul (2014, 2015a) argues that one cannot rationally decide whether to have a transformative experience by trying to form judgments, in advance, about (i) what it would feel like to have that experience, and (ii) the subjective value of having such an experience. The problem is if you haven’t had the experience then you cannot know what it is like, and you need to know what it is like to assess its value. However, in earlier work I argued that ‘what (...) it is like’-knowledge comes in degrees, and I briefly suggested that, consequently, some instances of Paul’s argument schema might commit a fallacy of equivocation. The aim of this paper is to further explore and strengthen this objection by, first, offering a new argument—the modelling argument—in support of it, and then by evaluating a range of replies that might be given to this objection on Paul’s behalf. I conclude that each reply either fails or, at best, only partially succeeds in defending some but not all instances of Paul’s argument schema. In closing, I consider how we might revise Paul’s concepts of transformative experiences and choices in response to this conclusion. (shrink)

A proposed plan to rescue US biomedical research from its current ‘malaise’ will not be effective as it misdiagnoses the root cause of the disease.

Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing (...) on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005). (shrink)

This commentary suggests that the ongoing malaise of biomedical research results from adopting a doctrine that is incompatible with the principles of creative scientific discovery and thus should be treated as a mental rather than somatic disorder. I overview the progression of the malaise, outline the doctrine and the history of its marriage to science, formulate the diagnosis, justify it by reviewing the symptoms of the malaise, and suggest how to begin to cure the disease.

What is the relationship between the linguistic properties of knowledge-how ascriptions and the nature of knowledge-how itself? In this chapter I address this question by examining the linguistic methodology of Stanley and Williamson (2011) and Stanley (2011a, 2011b) who defend the intellectualist view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. My evaluation of this methodology is mixed. On the one hand, I defend Stanley and Williamson (2011) against critics who argue that the linguistic premises they appeal to—about the syntax and (...) semantics of knowledge-how and knowledge-wh ascriptions—do not establish their desired conclusions about the nature of knowledge-how itself. But, on the other hand, I also criticize the role that linguistic considerations play in Stanley’s (2011a) response to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples to intellectualism. (shrink)

This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.

Many philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a (...) wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and it does not lead to scepticism. (shrink)

Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of (...) philosophy in the analytic tradition. This article focuses on that work. (shrink)

I argue that the contemporary interplay of cosmology and particle physics in their joint effort to understand the processes at work during the first moments of the big bang has important implications for understanding the nature of lawhood. I focus on the phenomenon of spontaneous symmetry breaking responsible for generating the masses of certain particles. This phenomenon presents problems for the currently fashionable Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory and strongly favors a rival nomic ontology of causal powers.

This paper addresses the field of economic measurements of the value of assets, carried out by the methods of independent expert evaluation. The mathematical principles of application, within a comparative methodical approach, of additive and multiplicative models for correcting the cost of single indicator of compared objects have been considered. The differences of mathematical basis of the compared models were analyzed. It has been shown that the ambiguity in the methodology of correction procedure requires studying the advantages and disadvantages of (...) known models, as well as the justification and elaboration of recommendations for their application. Possible forms of correction representation using several alternative units of measurement have been defined; formulas for their interconnection have been built. Analytic expressions have been derived that mathematically describe the algorithms for performing the evaluation correction procedure using various forms of correction representation. The influence of the correction execution model on the characteristics of uncertainty in the independent evaluation result has been analyzed. The scope of two possible types of correction introduction models has been determined. A specific numerical example was used to demonstrate the methodological advantages of using a multiplicative model when summarizing percentage corrections. The independence of the correction result on the sequence of correction introduction has been confirmed. It is proposed to use the selected measure of partial corrections as a criterion for the adequacy of the correction introduction model. It is proved that the result of the independent expert evaluation depends on the chosen model and does not depend on the sequence of correction introduction. The reported study results are important in terms of theory and practice since they make it possible to improve the accuracy and reliability of the result of independent expert evaluation. (shrink)

In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate (...) in this thesis that the ability hypothesis can be restated using the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. With regards to the status of intellectualism, I argue that the two main traditional arguments against intellectualism do not succeed. I also provide new and, I claim, successful arguments against intellectualism. These arguments point to a new view of knowledge-how that is distinct from both the standard intellectualist and Rylean views of knowledge-how. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Seumas Miller's view on knowing-how and joint abilities.

The present essay took as its hypothesis the premise that the Metaphysical Neutrality proposed by Husserl since his initial studies needs to be recognized with methodological and analytical limits. In order to overcome this limit, a recovery of the Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge of St. Thomas Aquinas was carried out, interpreting this theory through a Moderate and Direct Realism. As a conclusion, it was possible to identify that there is a very important similarity between both theories, as well as (...) that for phenomenological investigations to achieve their primary cognitive intent, care must be taken not to annihilate moderate realist metaphysics. (shrink)

This is a transcript of a conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans in 1973, filmed for The Open University. Under the title 'Truth', Strawson and Evans discuss the question as to whether the distinction between genuinely fact-stating uses of language and other uses can be grounded on a theory of truth, especially a 'thin' notion of truth in the tradition of F P Ramsey.

The author’s studies in the philosophy of science, culminating in this book, were inspired by his previous research in the domains of classical and quantum gravity. In fact it was the need to bring some order in the family of modern classical theories of gravitation and to build up the appropriate conceptual foundations of quantum gravity , that forced the author to create his own methodological model of theory change, which he applies rather successfully to the most controversial case study, (...) the Lorentz-Einstein transition. (shrink)

Neural machine translation (NMT) is one of the success stories of deep learning and artificial intelligence. Revolutionary innovations in the computational architectures made in 2015–2017 have led to dramatic improvements in the quality of machine translation (MT) and changed the field forever. Some professional translators welcome these changes with enthusiasm, others less so. But everyone has to deal with them. Historically, the relationship between human translation and MT has been uneasy and complicated, but an increasing number of players in both (...) fields are now coming to view it as synergistic. -/- OPUS-CAT is a collection of machine translation software based on a Windows implementation of Marian NMT—a stable production-ready neural machine translation framework used in many industrial and research applications. It can be installed on your PC, fine-tuned to specialized translation domains, and integrated into CAT tools. (shrink)

P. F. Strawson; II*—Scruton and Wright on Anti-Realism Etc., Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 15–22, https://doi.

Tradução para o português do livro "Ceticismo e naturalismo: algumas variedades", Strawson, P. F. . São Leopoldo, RS: Editora da Unisinos, 2008, 114 p. Coleção: Ideias. ISBN: 9788574313214. Capítulo 1 - Ceticismo, naturalismo e argumentos transcendentais 1. Notas introdutórias; 2. Ceticismo tradicional; 3. Hume: Razão e Natureza; 4. Hume e Wittgenstein; 5. “Apenas relacionar”: O papel dos argumentos transcendentais; 6. Três citações; 7. Historicismo: e o passado.

Some scientific categories seem to correspond to genuine features of the world and are indispensable for successful science in some domain; in short, they are natural kinds. This book gives a general account of what it is to be a natural kind and puts the account to work illuminating numerous specific examples.

The notion of a simulating termination analyzer is examined at the concrete level of pairs of C functions. This is similar to AProVE: Non-Termination Witnesses for C Programs. The termination status decision is made on the basis of the dynamic behavior of the input. This paper explores what happens when a simulating termination analyzer is applied to an input that calls itself.

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, (...) p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra. (shrink)

If two theory formulations are merely different expressions of the same theory, then any problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the underdetermination of theories by data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere alternate formulations before we can say anything substantive about underdetermination, that we need to solve the problem of identical rivals before addressing the problem of underdetermination. Here I consider two possible solutions: Quine proposes that we (...) call two theories identical if they are equivalent under a reconstrual of predicates, but this would mishandle important cases. Another proposal is to defer to the particular judgements of actual scientists. Consideration of an historical episodethe alleged equivalence of wave and matrix mechanicsshows that this second proposal also fails. Nevertheless, I suggest, the original suspicion is wrong; there are ways to enquire into underdetermination without having solved the problem of identical rivals. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to 18 of the essays on panpsychism in this issue. Along the way, I sketch out what a post-Galilean science of consciousness, one in which consciousness is taken to be a fundamental feature of reality, might look like.

In this paper, I explore and defend the idea that musical works are historical individuals. Guy Rohrbaugh (2003) proposes this for works of art in general. Julian Dodd (2007) objects that the whole idea is outré metaphysics, that it is too far beyond the pale to be taken seriously. Their disagreement could be seen as a skirmish in the broader war between revisionists and reactionaries, a conflict about which of metaphysics and art should trump the other when there is a (...) conflict. That dispute is a matter of philosophical methodology as much as it is a dispute about art. I argue that the ontology of works as individuals need not be dunked in that morass. My primary strategy is to show, contra Dodd's accusation, that historical individuals are familiar parts of the world. Although the ontological details are open to debate, it is the standard opinion of biologists is that biological species are historical individuals. So there is no conflict here between fidelity to art and respectable metaphysics. What suits species will fit musical work as well. (shrink)

When we ask what natural kinds are, there are two different things we might have in mind. The first, which I’ll call the taxonomy question, is what distinguishes a category which is a natural kind from an arbitrary class. The second, which I’ll call the ontology question, is what manner of stuff there is that realizes the category. Many philosophers have systematically conflated the two questions. The confusion is exhibited both by essentialists and by philosophers who pose their accounts in (...) terms of similarity. It also leads to misreading philosophers who do make the distinction. Distinguishing the questions allows for a more subtle understanding of both natural kinds and their underlying metaphysics. (shrink)

Philosophy in Africa has for more than a decade now been dominated by the discussion of one compound question, namely, is there an African philosophy, and if there is, what is it? The first part of the question has generally been unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. Dispute has been primarily over the second part of the question as various specimens of African philosophy presented do not seem to pass muster. Those of us who refuse to accept certain specimens as philosophy (...) have generally been rather illogically said also to deny an affirmative answer to the first part of the question. In a paper presented at the International Symposium in Memory of Dr William Amo, the Ghanaian philosopher who taught in German universities in the early part of the eighteenth century, Professor Odera Oruka identified four trends, perhaps more appropriately approaches, in current African philosophy. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Freedom and Resentment”, de P. F. Strawson. Publicado originalmente em Proceedings of the British Academy, v. 48, 1960. Republicado em Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 2-28]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora da UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250.

The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical prototype for our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate notions: Kinds and natural groups. Considering these, along with the accounts of Mill’s nineteenth-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind as worthy of inclusion in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a category meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions offer separate answers to the two questions: natural groups (...) for taxonomy and Kinds for ontology. This distinction is ignored in many contemporary debates about natural kinds and is obscured by the standard narrative that treats our natural kinds just as a development of Mill’s Kinds. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Social Morality and Individual Ideal”. Publicado originalmente em Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol. XXXVI, n. 136, p. 1-17, Jan. 1961. Republicado em: STRAWSON, P. F. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 26-44]. ]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora da (...) UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250. (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as (...) providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world (...) and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being. (shrink)

There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: "Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing". Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: "If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us". C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading (...) the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce's Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean motivation. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and (...) so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. (shrink)

Homeostatic property clusters (HPCs) are offered as a way of understanding natural kinds, especially biological species. I review the HPC approach and then discuss an objection by Ereshefsky and Matthen, to the effect that an HPC qua cluster seems ill-fitted as a description of a polymorphic species. The standard response by champions of the HPC approach is to say that all members of a polymorphic species have things in common, namely dispositions or conditional properties. I argue that this response fails. (...) Instances of an HPC kind need not all be similar in their exhibited properties. Instead, HPCs should instead be understood as unified by the underlying causal mechanism that maintains them. The causal mechanism can both produce and explain some systematic differences between a kind’s members. An HPC kind is best understood not as a single cluster of properties maintained in stasis by causal forces, but as a complex of related property clusters kept in relation by an underlying causal process. This approach requires recognizing that taxonomic systems serve both explanatory and inductive purposes. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding: `Surrender!' is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are declaratives — is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premisses is true; similarly, I suggest, a pure imperative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are imperatives — is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is (...) obeyed (alternatively: binding) if the conjunction of its premisses is. I argue that there are two kinds of bindingness, and that a vacillation between two corresponding variants of bindingness-validity largely explains conflicting intuitions concerning the validity of some pure imperative arguments. I prove that for each of those two variants of bindingness-validity there is an equivalent variant of obedience-validity. Finally, I address alternative accounts of pure imperative inference. (shrink)

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a (...) theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social, political, and historical. (shrink)

There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture community opinion, especially in cases that matter to us.

forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), symbolizing English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as modal logic, soundness, and functional completeness. Exercises with solutions are available. (...) It is provided in PDF (for screen reading, printing, and a special version for dyslexics), HTML, and in LaTeX source code. (shrink)